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THE AUTHOR’S EARNEST CRY AND PRAYER1 [ORIGINAL EXCERPTS]
Tell them wha hae the chief direction,
Scotland an’ me’s in great affliction,
E’er sin’ they laid that curst restriction
On aqua-vitae;
An’ rouse them up to strong conviction,
An’ move their pity.
...
Is there, that bears the name o’ Scot,
But feels his heart’s bluid rising hot,
To see his poor auld mither’s pot
Thus dung in staves,
An’ plunder’d o’ her hindmost groat,
By gallows knaves?
...
But bring a Scotsman frae his hill,
Clap in his cheek a Highland gill,
Say, such is royal George’s will,
An’ there's the foe!
He has nae thought but how to kill
Twa at a blow.
...
Scotland, my auld, respected mither!
Tho’ whiles ye moistify your leather,
Till whare ye sit on craps o’ heather
Ye tine your dam,
Freedom and whisky gang thegither,
Tak aff your dram!

ROBERT BURNS, THE AUTHOR’S EARNEST CRY AND PRAYER (1786). When Robert
Burns wrote this poem, it was aimed at the Scotch Representatives in the House of Commons. Burns intended to make known his frustration with the Scotch Distillery Act of 1786
and what he perceived to be Parliament’s bias against the national drink of Scotland. This
was one of several legislative attempts by the British to disadvantage local distillers and
those using domestic stills to produce the aqua-vitae (water of life). Jon Sanders, Freedom
and Whisky Go Together Like Tyranny and Oppression, AM. INST. FOR ECON. RSCH. (Jan.
25, 2022), https://www.aier.org/article/freedom-and-whisky-go-together-like-tyrannyand-oppression.
1
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I. INTRODUCTION
On the twenty-third of June, 2016, the eyes of Europe were cast on the
British Isles as the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, effectively withdrawing from the European community with just under 52% of
voters deciding in favor of the decision, known as Brexit.2 Voters in Scotland,
however, cast their ballots overwhelmingly against the move, with 62% of
Scots voting in favor of the UK remaining a member of the European Union.3
This dramatic restructuring came just two years after the failure of a national
referendum in which Scottish voters were asked whether the nation should
seek independence from the United Kingdom, with 45% voting in favor.4
Many believe that the Brexit decision and the corresponding loss of European citizenship sufficiently changes the calculus to produce an outcome in
favor of Scottish independence should a second referendum be put forth.5 Additionally, recent legislation passed by the UK Parliament systematically undermines the devolution of powers and the Scottish Parliament as Westminster attempts to formulate new internal trade policy to replace the EU single
market system.6 This is by design, with UK ministers in London lambasting
the “constitutional vandalism” that was the creation of the Scottish Parliament
and hoping to “find an effective way of restoring [the] constitution to its
2 EU Referendum Results, THE ELECTORAL COMM’N (2016), https://web.archive.
org/web/20160630063455/https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-bysubject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/
electorate-and-count-information.
3 Id.
4
Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19,
2014), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-29270441. See also Steven Erlanger &
Alan Cowell, Scotland Rejects Independence from Britain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/europe/scotland-independence-vote.html.
5 See Ashley Cowburn, Clear Majority in Favour of Scottish Independence, Poll
Shows, THE INDEP. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
scotland-indy-ref-nicola-sturgeon-majority-boris-johnson-b1036611.html (highlighting a
recent survey in which 58% of Scottish respondents said they would vote ‘Yes’ on a second
independence referendum). But see Severin Carrell, Nicola Sturgeon Seeks Supreme Court
Ruling on Scottish Independence Vote, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jun/28/nicola-sturgeon-seeks-supreme-courtruling-on-scottish-independence-referendum-vote (noting that Scottish Tory leader, Douglas Ross, is concerned that the First Minister is fomenting division at a time of economic
crisis: “Nicola Sturgeon has shown again today that the SNP’s selfish obsession with another divisive referendum is always their top priority . . . . She will use government time
and resources to further her plan to break up the country, just when we need to be pulling
together and working as one.”).
6 United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, c. 27, https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/contents/enacted. Because of the geographic location of its central
operations in the Westminster area of Central London, the UK government is commonly
referred to simply as Westminster. History of 10 Downing Street, UK GOV’T,
https://www.gov.uk/government/history/10-downing-street (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
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proper form.”7 In reality, the euphemistic “proper form” amounts to a unitary
power structure issuing edicts from London. By way of comparison, “Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland … have as much power in the U.K. as Puerto
Rico in the U.S. – none.”8 With the passage of the United Kingdom Internal
Market Act of 2020,9 Westminster severely constrained the ability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate effectively in devolved policy areas, violating the
Sewel Convention.10 Since 1997, when 74% of the Scottish electorate voted
to establish an independent Scottish Parliament, the devolution settlement has
provided the Scottish people with a measure of self-governance, allowing
matters of national importance to be decided closer to home by a democratically elected Parliament of Scots.11
The practical effect of the Internal Market Act is that UK ministers now
exercise discretion over the scope of devolved powers, recklessly constraining
Scottish self-governance in a way that is antithetical to the values of local
autonomy notably protected within the framework of the EU single market.12
In the EU single market, emphasis is placed on allowing states to pursue social
policy objectives alongside economic growth, which allowed Scotland to take
a balanced approach that promoted sustainable economic growth against the
broader backdrop of social and environmental policy goals.13 Unlike the EU
single market, the approach adopted by the UK Government “does not recognise that there is a far greater range of legitimate policy goals – for example
tackling inequality or environmental protection – that nations in a shared market area can pursue through market regulation.”14 Additionally, the Internal
Market Act enables UK ministers to diminish the powers of the Scottish

7

HC Deb (26 Nov. 2020) (684) col. 989 (UK).
Benjamin Verheiden, Opinion, How Brexit Exposed the Truth on the UK Power
Structure, DAILY SUNDIAL (Sept. 28, 2021), https://sundial.csun.edu/165741/opinions/
opinion-how-brexit-exposed-the-truth-on-the-uk-power-structure.
9 United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, c. 27, https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/contents/enacted.
10 Paul Bowers, The Sewel Convention, PARLIAMENT & CONST. CENTRE (2005),
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.UK/documents/SN02084/SN02084.pdf.
The
Sewel Convention is the constitutional rule that the UK Parliament “w[ill] not normally
legislate with regard to devolved matters” or alter the competence of the Scottish Parliament without its consent. Id.
11
Scottish Referendum Live – The Results, BBC NEWS (1997),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/devolution/scotland/live/index.shtml.
12 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, AFTER BREXIT: THE UK INTERNAL MARKET ACT
& DEVOLUTION 2 (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.gov.scot/publications/brexit-uk-internalmarket-act-devolution.
13 ECON. DEV. DIRECTORATE, SCOTLAND’S PLACE IN EUROPE: PEOPLE, JOBS AND
INVESTMENT (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.gov.scot/publications/scotlands-place-europepeople-jobs-investment.
14 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 59.
8
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Parliament and bring formerly devolved policy areas within the scope of central market control.15
Given the loss of local control along with the substantial economic and
social consequences resulting from Scotland’s removal from the European
Union against the will of its people, this Note argues that it is in the Scottish
national interest to hold a second independence referendum to achieve sovereignty and independence from the United Kingdom through democratic secession. Because of the radical shift in geopolitical circumstances occasioned
by the Brexit decision, a second Scottish independence referendum is likely
to succeed, allowing Scotland to secede from the United Kingdom and rejoin
the European Union and the corresponding economic community.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Parliament of Scotland
For over a millennium, Scotland has enjoyed a distinct and unique cultural
identity, and has for almost as long been engaged in a perpetual battle for
sovereignty and self-determination.16 With the Acts of Union in 1707, Scotland and England, who had shared a monarch since the Union of Crowns in
1603, were “United into One Kingdom by the Name of Great Britain.”17 The
decades that followed brought significant cultural, religious, and political conflict, culminating in the Jacobite uprisings of 1715, 1719, and 1745.18 The
final Jacobite stand at the Battle of Culloden in 1746 signified a de facto end
to traditional Scottish highland culture.19 The Age of Enlightenment that
15

Id. ¶ 8.
See generally History, BRAND SCOTLAND, https://www.scotland.org/aboutscotland/history (last visited Sept. 28, 2022) (“The history of Scotland is fascinating and
complex; there are Roman soldiers, Vikings, noble clansmen and powerful monarchs, but
more recently there are world-changing discoveries and innovations, groundbreaking technologies and an incredibly progressive society. This is Scotland, now.”).
17 Union with England Act 1707 § 1, c. 7, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aosp/
1707/7/contents. See generally Union of Crowns, UK PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/act-of-union1707/overview/union-of-the-crowns (last visited Oct. 11, 2022) (discussing the unification
achieved by the 1603 Union of Crowns).
18 See generally Jacobite Risings, NAT’L ARMY MUSEUM, https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/Jacobites (last visited Sept. 28, 2022) (“The Jacobites sought to restore the House of
Stuart to the British throne. Staging rebellions in Scotland in 1715, 1719 and 1745, they
attempted to overthrow the ruling Hanoverian Royal Family. The Jacobites were encouraged and assisted by Britain’s enemies, in particular the French, who saw support for the
Stuarts as a way of distracting Britain from its military campaigns overseas.”).
19 Id. (“On 16 April 1746 the two armies faced each other at Culloden, to the south
west of Nairn. Pounded by artillery, the outnumbered Jacobites launched a fearsome Highland sword charge. Although [the English] came under heavy pressure, [their] soldiers held
firm with their bayonets. Charles’s army was routed and the ‘Bonnie Prince’ was forced to
16

268

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 51:1

followed brought new ideas about philosophy, politics, economics, and science, propelling Scotland into the nineteenth century characterized by new
industrialism and urbanism.20
From the early thirteenth century until its unification with England in
1707, the Parliament of Scotland served as the national legislature of Scotland
and played a central role in the administration of justice, foreign affairs, taxation, war, and all other matters of public policy.21 With the formation of the
United Kingdom came the dissolution of the Parliament of Scotland, and legislative authority was consolidated into a single Parliament of Great Britain,
sitting at Westminster in London.22 Following World War I, in which Scottish
soldiers fought and died in overwhelming numbers, came a resurgence of the
idea that the Scottish people should enjoy a unique national identity with the
right of self-determination.23 This nationalist sentiment grew throughout the
twentieth century, culminating in the devolution referendum of 1997, in which
a majority of Scots voted to establish an independent Scottish Parliament of
devolved powers.24 The new Scottish Parliament held its first session on May
12, 1999.25
B. Impact of Devolution
The devolution settlement following the 1997 referendum was based on a
model of reserved powers, meaning that a power is devolved to the Scottish
Parliament unless expressly reserved to Westminster.26 With a few narrow
exceptions, UK ministers have no authority to review or influence the decisions of the Scottish Parliament in devolved policy areas.27 Major areas over
which the Scottish Parliament has traditionally exercised legislative
make a dramatic escape to France. … After Culloden, wounded Highlanders were bayoneted where they lay and Charles’s fleeing soldiers were ruthlessly hunted down.”). In the
aftermath, Parliament outlawed “the wearing of ‘Highland clothes,’ including the kilt, tartan, [and] plaid,” as well as the playing of bagpipes and the teaching of the Gaelic language.
Sanders, supra note 1.
20 See generally ALEXANDER BROADIE, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: THE
HISTORICAL AGE OF THE HISTORICAL NATION (2001) (considering “the achievement of this
most astonishing period of Scottish history”).
21 SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY CORP. BODY, THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT – PAST AND
PRESENT 2–13 (2013), http://www.parlamaid-alba.org/EducationandCommunityPartnershipsresources/SP_Timeline_English.pdf.
22 Id. at 13.
23 Brooke Krancer, “Winning Little Bannockburns”: Memory, the Great War, and the
Rise of Scottish Nationalism, 26 PENN. HIST. REV.: J. UNDERGRAD. HISTS. 50, 56–67 (2019).
24 James Mitchell et al., The 1997 Devolution Referendum in Scotland, 51
PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 166, 166 (1998).
25 SCOTTISH PARLIAMENTARY CORP. BODY, supra note 21, at 18.
26 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 12.
27 Id.
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competence include land use, alcohol and tobacco regulation, social services,
higher education, healthcare, and the environment.28 Over the last decade, the
legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament has expanded through the
Scotland Act of 2012 and Scotland Act of 2016, most notably in public policy
areas such as taxation and social security.29 This increased democratic control
over legislative affairs has proven highly beneficial for Scotland, as decisions
affecting the local economy and the Scottish people can be made closer to
home by popularly elected and democratically accountable representatives
that reflect Scotland’s unique social, demographic, cultural, economic, environmental, and geographic makeup.30
C. Twenty-first Century
The May 2007 Holyrood election brought an abrupt end to the social democratic Labour Party’s eight-year control of the Scottish Government, with the
Scottish National Party (SNP) winning the most seats in the parliament (47
out of 129) and forming a minority government.31 Two months later, declaring
that “[n]o change was no longer an option,” First Minister Alex Salmond published a White Paper entitled A National Conversation, setting out the “full
range” of options for Scotland’s constitutional future, including the possibility
of an independence referendum.32 Four years later, the SNP achieved an even
more decisive electoral victory by taking sixty-nine seats and winning a majority in the parliament, paving the way for an unprecedented national independence referendum.33 In January 2012, Salmond announced his government’s intention to hold the independence referendum in the autumn of
2014.34 The question to be presented to voters was simply, “Do you agree that
Scotland should be an independent country?”35 and was altered slightly on the
28

Id. ¶ 16.
Compare Scotland Act 2012, c. 11 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/11/contents, with Scotland Act 2016, c. 11 (UK), https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/11/contents.
30 GOV’T OF SCOTLAND, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK (2021), https://nationalperformance.gov.scot/sites/default/files/documents/NPF_A2_Poster.pdf (setting out the
overall purpose of the Scottish Government: “[t]o focus on creating a more successful
country with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish through increased wellbeing, and
sustainable and inclusive economic growth”).
31 Timeline: Scottish Independence Referendum, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19907675.
32 Id.; ALEX SALMOND, YOUR SCOTLAND, YOUR VOICE: A NATIONAL CONVERSATION
(2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_11_09_referendum.pdf (setting out
the options for Scotland’s future and potential referendum).
33 Timeline: Scottish Independence Referendum, supra note 31.
34 Id.
35 Scottish Independence: Alex Salmond Outlines Referendum Question, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-16702392.
29
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official referendum ballot to read, “Should Scotland be an independent country?”36 The authority to legislate for the initiation of a referendum was transferred to the Scottish Parliament following the Edinburgh Agreement,37 which
was signed both by UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Scotland’s First
Minister Alex Salmond on October 15, 2012.38 With this power, the Scottish
Parliament passed the Scottish Independence Referendum Act of 2013 and the
similarly titled Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act to memorialize the plan for the referendum.39 The referendum was held on Thursday,
September 18, 2014, with polling places operating from 7:00 A.M. until 10:00
P.M., and the official results were announced the following day.40 The referendum produced an exceptionally high voter turnout, with nearly 85% of eligible Scots participating in the decision.41 The referendum ultimately failed,
with 55% of Scots voting to remain a part of the United Kingdom and just
45% voting in favor of Scottish independence.42 After the results were finalized, Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond told disappointed pro-independence supporters, “Today of all days as we bring Scotland together, let us not
dwell on the distance we have fallen short, let us dwell on the distance we
have travelled and have confidence the movement is abroad in Scotland that
will take this nation forward.”43
The overwhelming sentiment among those who voted against seceding
from the United Kingdom was concern about the economic viability of an
independent Scottish state.44 Of course, this decision was made in the context
of UK membership in the EU single market. It is against this background that
the consequences of the United Kingdom’s decision to relinquish membership
36
Scottish Independence Referendum, UK GOV’T (emphasis added),
https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/scottish-independence-referendum/about
(last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
37 Agreement Between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government
on a Referendum on Independence for Scotland, UK-Scot., Oct. 15, 2012, https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20130109092234/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Agreement-final-for-signing.pdf.
38 OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND, MILESTONES IN THE SCOTTISH
INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM PROCESS (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scottish-independence-milestones-on-the-road-to-the-referendum/milestones-in-thescottish-independence-referendum-process.
39 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 (ASP 14); Scottish Independence
(Franchise) Act 2013 (ASP 13).
40 OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND, supra note 38.
41 Christine Jeavans, In Maps: How Close Was the Scottish Referendum Vote?, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics29255449.
42 Scottish Referendum: Scotland Votes ‘No’ to Independence, supra note 4.
43 Id.
44 Sam Ball, Why Scotland Said No to Independence, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 19, 2014),
https://www.france24.com/en/20140919-why-scotland-said-no-independence-scottishreferendum-uk.
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in the European Union, against the will of the Scottish people, become salient,
opening the door to a renewed conversation about the economic and political
future of Scotland.45
III. ANALYSIS
A. United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020
Following its withdrawal from the European Union, the United Kingdom
began efforts to formulate its own internal trade policy to replace the EU single market system, within which the nation had operated its economy for several decades.46 Of the EU single market, one journalist noted:
Its creation served the UK’s economic interests, as it grew the
home domestic market available for British exporters without
tariff or non-tariff barriers, eventually to nearly half a billion
Europeans. It was not without irony that the tortuous negotiations of the past four years were made tougher by the EU’s
insistence on defending what it calls the “internal market”, itself created by the British.47
While the idea of an internal market does not have a universal definition,
a country’s production and trading activities tend to intersect with various areas of governance and legislative activity, implicating paramount public policy considerations. In the words of Professor Michael Dougan, internal markets are “not merely about ‘trade,’” but are also about “fundamental policy
choices concerning how to structure your economy and society; as well as
basic constitutional questions about the institutions, processes and values that
underpin your public and democratic realm.”48
The UK Internal Market Act is not simply a reversion back to the trading relationships as they existed within the United Kingdom before the formation of the EU single market; rather, “it is a new, unilaterally designed and
imposed regime, that will operate in a manner that does not allow for adequate
consideration of the types of fundamental policy choices outlined by Professor
45 See generally John Curtice, How Brexit Shapes People’s Views on Scottish Independence, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotlandpolitics-55803103 (discussing the extent to which the implications of Brexit have led to a
shift in attitudes about Scottish independence).
46 Faisal Islam, Adieu to the Single Market Created by the UK, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55494101.
47 Id.
48 Michael Dougan, How the UK’s ‘Internal Market’ is Dependent on EU Rules, UNIV.
OF LIVERPOOL NEWS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2018/03/02/watchprofessor-michael-dougan-uks-internal-market-dependent-eu-rules.
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Dougan.”49 Following the 2016 Brexit referendum, the governments that comprise the United Kingdom undertook to cooperate on the formulation of common frameworks, giving particular attention to a range of factors, including
“ensuring the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging
policy divergence.”50 Among the policy areas formerly governed by EU market rules—which are now purportedly subject to common frameworks agreements—are agriculture, public procurement, fisheries, plant and animal
health, and food safety.51 Contrary to the stated goal of agreeing to common
frameworks that respect differences between the nations, the UK Internal
Market Act introduces a new market access system, mandating that each constituent country accept all goods sold within the United Kingdom, regardless
of the particular state’s local standards.52 In response to the legislation, Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, Europe and External Affairs, Michael
Russell, lamented:
The Internal Market Act means that if chlorinated chicken and
hormone-injected beef are accepted for sale in England after a
trade deal with the US, then they would have to be accepted
for sale in Scotland too. And any future legislation in Scotland
to ban single use plastics and the environmental damage they
cause, or measures to tackle health issues such as obesity,
could be rendered ineffective. Given the direction of travel,
who knows what further restrictions on the Scottish Parliament
could be on the way?53
In March 2019, after two years of discussions, the Scottish Government
ceased participation in the common framework talks when it became evident
that its serious concerns regarding the project’s implications for the devolution framework were not given adequate weight.54 Having shared a similarly
frustrating experience in its attempt to influence the legislation, the Welsh
Government criticized the process, arguing that “it was agreed that this would
be a joint piece of work, [and] it is wholly unacceptable that we now seem to
be faced with a solely UK Government generated proposal.”55 Additionally,
49

CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 60.
51 Id.
52 United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, c. 27, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2020/27/contents/enacted.
53 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 2.
54 Id. at 1.
55 Letter from Jeremy Miles, Couns. Gen. and Minister for European Transition, Welsh
Gov’t, to The Rt. Hon. Michael Gove, C. of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the
Cabinet Off., United Kingdom Gov’t, and The Rt. Hon. Alok Sharma, Sec’y of State for
Bus., Energy and Indus. Strategy, United Kingdom Gov’t (July 7, 2020),
50
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the UK Government did not give the devolved administrations an advanced
copy of its White Paper on the internal market, allowed the governments just
four weeks to review and respond to the proposals, and placed the consultation
period during the Scottish Parliamentary recess.56 The bill itself was published
on September 9, 2020, its language shared with the devolved governments for
the first time late the night before.57 Despite the refusal of both the Scottish
Parliament and Welsh Senedd58 to consent to the Act, the UK Government
proceeded with implementing the legislation, which came into force on January 1, 2021, disregarding the constitutional norms set out in the Sewel Convention.59 Because the Internal Market Act is not amenable to modification
by the Scottish Parliament, there is growing concern within the devolved governments over the future exercise of legislative powers.60
B. United Kingdom Internal Market Contrasted with the European
Union Single Market
The United Kingdom’s devolution structure was created against the backdrop of membership in a supranational body governing external trade relationships among member states and issues of trade and regulatory uniformity
within the UK’s constituent countries.61 The UK Government intends for the
Internal Market Act to adequately replace the previous EU market regulatory
scheme; however, unlike the democratic processes within the European Union, the Internal Market Act unilaterally places severe restrictions on the ability of devolved governments to set local standards.62 Further, the European
Union is governed by the general principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, aiming to balance economic growth and other policy goals as well as local
decision-making power to the greatest extent possible.63 In contrast, the UK
https://gov.wales/sites/default/files/inline-documents/2020-07/letter-to-gove-andsharma.pdf.
56 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 68.
57 Id.
58 See generally About the Senedd, SENEDD CYMRU [WELSH PARLIAMENT],
https://senedd.wales (last visited Sept. 23, 2022) (“The Welsh Parliament is the democratically elected body that represents the interests of Wales and its people. Commonly known
as the Senedd, it makes laws for Wales, agrees Welsh taxes and holds the Welsh Government to account.”).
59 Bowers, supra note 10.
60 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 36.
61 MICHAEL DOUGAN, UNITED KINGDOM INTERNAL MARKET BILL: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVOLUTION (2020), https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/law/2-research/eull/
ukIM,Briefing,Paper,-,Prof,Michael,Dougan,15,September,2020.pdf.
62 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 57.
63 See Proportionality (EU), THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW (UK),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/3-503-0887?transitionType=Default&context
Data=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true (last visited Sept. 23, 2022).
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Government perceives any potential deviation from the principles of non-discrimination and mutual recognition through local regulation of domestic markets as detrimental to the flow of internal trade.64 While the EU single market
is governed by a broad commitment to the principles of non-discrimination
and mutual recognition, exceptions to both principles are permitted as long as
they “can be justified as necessary and proportionate to the outcome that is
obtained, and which cannot be achieved by other means.”65 The rigid nature
of the UK Internal Market Act’s treatment of the non-discrimination and mutual recognition principles, on the other hand, ultimately works against the
overarching goals of a free market to the extent that the Act operates to the
detriment of social, environmental, and public health initiatives.
In sum, the EU single market was developed over decades based on principles of trust, equality, cooperation, co-decision, proportionality, subsidiarity, and consent, while the UK Internal Market Act was all at once imposed
on the devolved governments with no baseline standards and—perhaps more
significantly—created the authority for UK ministers to unilaterally alter the
scope of the Act without seeking consent from the devolved administrations.66
The unprecedented way in which this new centralized regime governs the nature of economic policymaking goes well beyond the regulatory scheme provided by the EU single market and significantly undermines the ability of the
devolved parliaments to legislate in areas that have fallen within their competence for over twenty years, alarming lawmakers across the Isles.67

64

CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶¶ 99–100.
Id. See also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 36, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (providing that prohibitions or restrictions
on the movement of certain goods may be permitted if justified on a number of bases,
including the protection of “public morality, public policy or public security; the protection
of health and life of humans, animals or plants….”).
66 See CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the consequences of this UK legislation).
67 Communiqué from the Joint Ministerial Comm. (October 24, 2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
562364/joint-ministerial-committee-communique-24-october-2016.pdf (listing the three
principal agenda items of the Joint Ministerial Committee, chaired by then-Prime Minister
Theresa May, as: “the state of relations between the administrations, exiting the European
Union and economic growth and industrial strategy.”). See also Written Statement, Jeremy
Miles, Wales Coun. Gen. and Minister for European Transition, Legal Challenge to the UK
Internal Market Act 2020 (Jan. 19, 2021), https://gov.wales/written-statement-legalchallenge-uk-internal-market-act-2020 (announcing the initiation of formal proceedings by
the Welsh government in the Administrative Court seeking judicial review).
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C. Effect of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act on the Scottish
Devolution Settlement
i.

Structural and Investment Funds

One way in which the constituent nations of the United Kingdom are particularly disadvantaged as a result of withdrawal from the European Union is
through the loss of access to EU Structural and Investment Funds, which are
jointly managed by the European Commission and the EU member states
themselves.68 The purpose of these funds is to support job creation and economic development throughout member states and to foster a “sustainable and
healthy European economy and environment.”69 As plans came together for
the execution of Brexit, the Scottish Government expected to manage whatever UK-wide structural fund was established in its place, just as it had done
for decades within the framework of the European Union.70 The Scottish Government published a detailed report outlining how it planned to allocate the
replacement funds, which was developed through broad public consultation
at the beginning of 2020.71 Regarding the goal of the proposed program, the
Executive Summary states:
The key aim of the programme will be to focus on addressing
and reducing economic and social disparities within and between places and people in Scotland[.] Decentralisation of
funding is at the core of this approach, and we want to ensure
that decisions are made as closely as possible to the people,
businesses and communities who will be impacted[.] The
themes for the Scottish programme will be Improving Places,
Reducing Poverty, Increasing Skills, and Growing Business
and Jobs to aid a just and green recovery from
the COVID pandemic[.] Enhancing wellbeing and responding
to the climate change emergency will be underpinning principles of the programme.72

68 European Structural and Investment Funds, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.EU/info/funding-tenders/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes/overviewfunding-programmes/European-structural-and-investment-funds_en (last visited Sept. 29,
2022).
69 Id.
70 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 26.
71 ECON. DEV. DIRECTORATE, SCOTTISH REPLACEMENT FOR EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS
(2020),
https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-replacement-eu-structural-funds/
pages/2.
72 Id. at 7.
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The UK Government disregarded the comprehensive proposal of the Scottish Government, opting instead to operate the replacement to the EU Structural and Investment Funds (entitled the Shared Prosperity Fund) unilaterally,
without respect to local prioritization.73 The result amounts to a usurpation of
powers previously devolved to Scottish ministers to make localized spending
decisions reflecting the investment priorities and unique needs of the Scottish
people, businesses, and communities.74 The UK Internal Market Act represents an unprecedented barrier to market regulation across a wide range of
industries and will likely be the subject of extensive constitutional challenges
in the courts. In contrast to the Parliament of England, on which the Internal
Market Act will serve as a domestic legislative constraint imposed and controlled locally at Westminster, the Act will serve to disproportionately limit
the devolved competence enjoyed by the governments of Scotland and Wales.
Drastically limiting the powers of the devolved legislatures in favor of imposing an artificially homogenous approach to market regulation is likely to result
in negative economic effects felt across the United Kingdom.
ii.

Education

Another area in which citizens of the United Kingdom are beginning to
feel the impact of Brexit is in higher education, as Brits no longer have access
to membership in the European Union’s Erasmus Program.75 The program is
now consolidated with the other EU programs for education, training, and
youth sports under a single umbrella program called Erasmus+ (pronounced
Erasmus plus).76 Education in the United Kingdom is a devolved policy area,
and the Scottish Government has been consistently vocal about its fervent desire to continue its participation in Erasmus+.77 Unfortunately for Scottish students, President Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission has confirmed that as long as Scotland remains a part of the United Kingdom, it will
not be permitted to participate in the Erasmus Program as a full “Third Country” in its own right.78
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CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 91.
Id.
75 Extremely Disappointing: Britain Pulls Out of the Erasmus+ Program, ERASMUS
PROGRAMME (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.erasmusprogramme.com/guide/2021-BrexitExtremely-Disappointing-Britain-Pulls-Out-Of-The-Erasmus-Programme.
76
Erasmus Plus, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.EU/programmes/erasmusplus/node_en (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
77 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 28.
78 Cristina Gallardo, MEPs Ask if Scotland, Wales Can Rejoin Erasmus Student Program, POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/meps-push-to-welcomescotland-and-wales-back-in-erasmus-mobility-scheme.
74
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The UK Internal Market Act purports to give the UK Government control over funding for international education and training.79 In an effort to
quickly replace the robust educational network previously accessible to citizens of the United Kingdom through the Erasmus Program, the UK Government announced its intention to circumnavigate the devolved administrations
altogether and unilaterally impose a new plan, entitled the United Kingdom
Turing Scheme, named after the famed English mathematician and cryptographer Alan Turing, who played an integral role in breaking the German naval
Enigma code during World War II.80 The Scottish Government is concerned
that this proposed replacement infrastructure would be disadvantageous for
Scots, predicting that the vast reduction in opportunities for students and
teachers will leave Scotland unable to compete academically at the level historically enjoyed under the Erasmus Program.81 Scottish Further Education,
Higher Education and Science Minister, Richard Lochhead, spoke pessimistically about the scheme:
The U.K. government’s proposed replacement Turing scheme
is a shadow of the real thing, and does not fund the adult or
youth work sectors. It also significantly limits funding in other
areas, and offers no support for students wishing to visit Scotland. Without Erasmus, it is highly likely we will see a decline
in the numbers of European students visiting Scotland, while
those students who do visit are more likely to be from wealthier
backgrounds. Education is one of the powers devolved to the
Scottish government — so it’s unacceptable that the U.K. government is trying to impose this inadequate scheme upon Scotland and Wales.82
Furthermore, the usurpation of legislative competence in education policy
is likely to constrain Scotland’s ability to provide its citizen-students with the
best opportunities for educational mobility and exchange.83
79

United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, c. 27, § 50, https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/data.pdf.
80 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 28. See also About the Turing
Scheme, TURING SCHEME, https://www.turing-scheme.org.uk/about/about-the-turingscheme (last visited Sept. 29, 2022) (“The Turing Scheme is the UK government’s global
programme to study and work abroad. The scheme provides funding for international opportunities in education and training across the world. Supporting the government’s Global
Britain objectives, the Turing Scheme unlocks the opportunity for UK organisations to offer life-changing experiences across the world for their students, learners and pupils.”).
81 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 28.
82 Richard Lochhead, Opinion, Scotland Needs Erasmus, Not Britain’s Poor Replacement, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.politico.eu/article/scotland-erasmus-ukturing-scheme-brexit-Europe-eu.
83 Id.
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Market Access Principles

Under the devolution settlement, the countries comprising the United
Kingdom have for years employed varying import standards determined by
each individual state, rather than imposing a uniform regulatory scheme, in
order to reflect consumer preferences.84 In its attempt to achieve regulatory
coherence following Brexit, the UK Government threatens to destabilize the
devolution settlement by restricting the Scottish Parliament’s ability to set
regulatory standards in the area of trade policy.85 As a result, the following is
a concern commonly echoed in Scotland and Wales:
The UK Internal Market Act is built on an aggressively deregulatory structure. Its “market access principles” ensure that if
a product or service is freely marketed in one of the constituent
elements of the UK then it is entitled to unrestricted access to
the markets of the other constituent elements, subject only to a
very cramped range of possible exceptions to this general rule.
This is likely to undermine the regulatory autonomy promised
to Scotland and Wales under their devolution settlements.86
The scope of the UK Internal Market Act is much broader than the framework governing states within the EU single market, while providing far fewer
exemptions to its application and severely limiting how Scottish businesses
can respond to consumer preferences in the marketplace.87
One key policy area in which the Scottish Government has legislated is the
regulation of alcohol sales. In 2018, finding that heavy alcohol consumption
has negative effects on individuals and families that tend to bleed into society
at large, the Scottish Parliament passed legislation to implement minimum
unit pricing of fifty pence per unit of alcohol.88 The rationale behind the decision was that making alcohol more expensive would reduce related deaths and
hospitalizations, decrease secondary harms related to heavy alcohol use, and
ultimately benefit the Scottish healthcare system and society.89 With the
84

CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 116.
Will the United Kingdom Survive the United Kingdom Internal Market Act?, UK IN A CHANGING EUROPE (May 7, 2021), https://ukandeu.
ac.uk/will-the-united-kingdom-survive-the-united-kingdom-internal-market-act.
86 Id.
87 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 115.
88 POPULATION HEALTH DIRECTORATE, ALCOHOL FRAMEWORK 2018: PREVENTING
HARM (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.gov.scot/publications/alcohol-framework-2018preventing-harm-next-steps-changing-relationship-alcohol.
89 Id. at 2 (noting that alcohol-specific deaths in Scotland totaled 1,120 in 2017: “Let
me be clear – each and every one was preventable. Scotland’s families and communities
are paying too high a price, we need concerted efforts; across Government, across the
85 Stephen Weatherill, Commentary,
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implementation of the UK Internal Market Act, such public health measures
taken by the devolved governments are no longer permitted under the nondiscrimination principles, constraining the ability of the Scottish Parliament
to make decisions in the interest of the Scottish people.90 The Internal Market
Act effectively bars any variation in the approaches taken by the devolved
governments in service to local consumer, health, and environmental considerations in favor of imposing a uniform set of standards, which has been referred to as a “lowest common denominator.”91
Scotland’s food and drink industries have historically been held—through
local regulation—to high quality and safety standards.92 Through its market
access provisions of mutual recognition and non-discrimination, the UK Internal Market Act forces the devolved governments to accept lower import
standards unilaterally put in place by Westminster.93 The result is likely to be
a flood of low-quality products entering the marketplace because administrations will no longer be empowered to advance public health initiatives through
import regulation.94 Furthermore, the Act goes so far as to prohibit the Scottish Parliament from passing legislation to require appropriate labelling for
such products now being sold in Scotland, preventing consumers from making
informed choices when shopping for groceries.95 This is again by design, as
forcing mutual recognition of relaxed health and quality standards on the domestic market will certainly facilitate the speedy execution of international
trade agreements, which are urgently needed following the United Kingdom’s
exit from the European Union and the loss of its single market framework.96
iv.

Sustainability

Within the United Kingdom, Scotland is leading the way in its efforts to
mitigate the issue of climate change through increased energy efficiency, zero
and low emissions heating, reduced reliance on single-use plastics, and its robust microgeneration supply chain.97 These are important steps towards
public and voluntary sectors, across Parliament; to turn around the harms associated with
higher-risk alcohol consumption and problematic drug use.”).
90 United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, c. 27, § 5, https://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2020/27/data.pdf.
91 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 114.
92 Id.
93 Weatherill, supra note 85.
94 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, ¶ 119. For example, if the Scottish
Parliament desires to maintain its current ban on the sale of chlorinated chicken or hormone-fed beef in Scotland—in violation of the Act’s regulatory equivalence measures—
the UK Parliament may now override the will of the Scottish people acting through their
elected representatives. Id. ¶ 121.
95 Weatherill, supra note 85.
96 Id.
97 CONST. & CABINET DIRECTORATE, supra note 12, at 31.
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reducing greenhouse gas emissions and addressing fuel poverty.98 The Scottish Government is particularly concerned with the environmental damage
caused by single-use plastics and has taken considerable steps to reduce their
prevalence in the country, including becoming the first nation in the United
Kingdom to ban plastic-stemmed cotton swabs in 2019.99
The mutual recognition principle of the UK Internal Market Act threatens
to undermine these policy goals by constraining the ability of the Scottish Parliament to impose restrictions on products that it considers harmful to the environment.100 While Scotland retains the ability to limit the local production
of such items, if more permissive standards are in place elsewhere in the
United Kingdom, Scotland would have no power to ban or restrict the sale of
imported products within its market, in turn undermining the Scottish Parliament’s ability to exercise its devolved powers to mitigate the serious economic, social, and environmental impacts of large-scale single-use plastic
consumption.101
IV. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR SECESSION
Speculation about the possibility of a second independence referendum is
widespread, and the prospect has been colloquially dubbed “Indyref2.”102 The
First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, hopes to see a second referendum
take place in October 2023, once again asking Scottish voters, “Should Scotland be an independent country?”103 The push for a second referendum has
long been at the forefront of the Scottish National Party’s platform, and with
its strong performance in the May 2021 Scottish Parliamentary election,104 the
party is determined to move forward with Indyref2.105 Following the SNP’s
strong electoral finish, the party’s spokesperson for constitutional affairs,
Tommy Sheppard, declared that the Scottish people “have voted to have the
choice” and that his government “will make sure that they get it.”106
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Id.
Scotland Bans Plastic Stemmed Cotton Buds, THE ROYAL ENV’T HEALTH INST. OF
SCOT. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.rehis.com/news/scotland-bans-plastic-stemmedcotton-buds.
100 Weatherill, supra note 85.
101 Id.
102 Chris Lomas, The Long Road to Indyref2, POLITICS.CO.UK (Sept. 24, 2021, 9:32
AM), https://www.politics.co.uk/in-depth/2021/09/24/the-long-road-to-indyref2.
103 Carrell, supra note 5.
104 Scottish Election 2021: Nicola Sturgeon Celebrates ‘Historic’ SNP Election Win,
BBC NEWS (May 9, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics57038039 (noting that the SNP won 64 of the 129 seats in the Scottish Parliament, just one
seat away from attaining a controlling majority).
105 Lomas, supra note 102.
106 Id.
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A major obstacle to securing a second independence referendum could be
convincing the staunchly opposed UK Government to grant Scotland consent
to hold the vote under Section 30 of the 1998 Scotland Act, which allows the
Scottish Parliament to legislate in areas normally reserved to Westminster.107
While there is some disagreement among authorities and constitutional scholars about whether or not Scotland needs permission from Westminster to hold
a second referendum, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has stated that there is
“no democratic justification” for UK ministers to block the will of the Scottish
people.108 Seeming to disagree, then-UK Prime Minister Liz Truss dismissed
Sturgeon as an “attention seeker” whose calls for a second referendum
“should be ignored.”109 To resolve this question, Nicola Sturgeon requested
that her lord advocate, Dorothy Bain QC, write to the Supreme Court in London, asking it to establish whether the Scottish Government has the necessary
legal powers to stage a consultative referendum on its own.110 A decision is
expected in early 2023.111
Whether or not the Scottish Government has the constitutional authority to
go forward with a second referendum on its own, Scotland would ultimately
need the blessing of the UK Government in order to achieve meaningful
recognition on the international stage.112 In 2019, with the approval of the
Scottish Parliament, First Minister Sturgeon formally wrote to then-Prime
Minister Boris Johnson, requesting the transfer of powers to legally hold another independence referendum under Section 30 of the Scotland Act.113 The
Scottish First Minister said, “I want to have a legal referendum . . . to give
people the right to choose. That’s democracy. It’s not about what I want or
what [the UK Government] wants.”114 This strikes a drastically different tone
than the first independence referendum:
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Libby Brooks, Sturgeon Demands Independence Referendum Powers Be Devolved,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/19/
nicola-sturgeon-requests-independence-referendum-powers.
108 Scottish Election 2021: Nicola Sturgeon Celebrates ‘Historic’ SNP Election Win,
supra note 104.
109 Matthew Weaver, Sturgeon Warns Truss Not to ‘Gerrymander’ Scottish Referendum Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2022/sep/04/sturgeon-warns-truss-not-gerrymander-scottish-referendum-rules.
110 Carrell, supra note 5.
111 Weaver, supra note 109.
112 Andrew Cannon & Hannah Ambrose, Scottish Independence: The International
Law Implications, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/scottish-independence-the-international-law-implications.
113 Brooks, supra note 107. See also Philip Sim, Scottish Independence: What is a Section 30 Order?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-50744526.
114 Libby Brooks, Sturgeon: SNP Will Hold Scottish Independence Vote if it Wins in
May, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2021, 7:14 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2021/jan/24/scotland-independence-referendum-nicola-sturgeon-snp-wins-may-.
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The previous referendum in 2014 was underpinned by an
agreement between the Scottish and UK governments to formally transfer powers to Holyrood. This meant [the Scottish
Parliament] could legislate for a referendum without any wrangling over who actually had the powers in the first place everyone was signed up to the process.115
It is unlikely that the UK Government will grant the Section 30 order;
however, the Scottish National Party previously said that if pro-independence
parties won a majority of seats in the May 2021 Scottish Parliamentary election (which—coalesced with the Scottish Greens—they did), the Scottish
Government would move to authorize a referendum even in the absence of a
Section 30 order.116 An affirmative vote on a second referendum held without
Westminster’s consent could be used to show the democratic will of the Scottish people and subsequently pressure the UK Parliament to relinquish sovereignty over Scotland.117
V. INDEPENDENCE AND BEYOND
A. European Union Membership
Following a successful execution of the democratic secession process from
the United Kingdom, the first logical step for Scotland would be to regain
membership in the European Union. There is some indication that the European Union would welcome Scottish membership, with Former European
Counsel President Donald Tusk, on the level of support in the European Union
for Scotland becoming a member state, stating, “Emotionally I have no doubt
that everyone will be enthusiastic here in Brussels, and more generally in Europe.”118 The application process for joining the European Union is set out in
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, printed below in its entirety, and
allows any “European State” to apply to become a member:
Any European State which respects the values referred to in
Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to
become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and
national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The

115 Philip Sim, Scottish Independence: Could the Supreme Court Rule on a Referendum, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotlandpolitics-57047898.
116 Brooks, supra note 114.
117 Id.
118 'Empathy' for Independent Scotland Joining the EU Says Tusk, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-51342714.
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applicant State shall address its application to the Council,
which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission
and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament,
which shall act by a majority of its component members. The
conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council
shall be taken into account. The conditions of admission and
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded,
which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This
agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.119
Because of the requirement that applicants be independent, sovereign
states, Scotland must formally resolve its independence from the United Kingdom before making its application.120 The requirement that Scotland achieve
sovereignty before initiating the application process means that there would
be a period of time following independence during which Scotland would be
neither a member of the European Union nor a party to the European UnionUnited Kingdom Trade and Cooperation Agreement (and similar free trade
agreements) which currently apply to Scotland by virtue of being within the
United Kingdom.121
Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, all membership applications require the unanimous approval of the Council of the European Union,
along with a majority of member states in the European Parliament.122 One
potential area of concern is that Spain, an EU member state, is currently resisting a movement in Catalonia to secede from Spain and become independent, which might lead Spain to veto an attempt by a newly independent Scotland to join the European Union.123 A key distinction between the situations
in Spain and in the United Kingdom, however, is that the Scottish National
Party is seeking independence only in accordance with the laws of the United
Kingdom, whereas Spain’s 1978 Constitution provides for the “indissoluble
unity of the Spanish nation,” meaning that the Catalan attempts at independence are, by definition, not in accordance with the laws of Spain.124 At the end
119 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 49, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C326) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
120 Paul Butcher, Scottish Independence and EU Membership: Process and Implications, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/scottish-independence-and-eu-membership-process-and-implications.
121 Id.
122 TEU, supra note 119, at art. 49.
123 Butcher, supra note 120.
124 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).
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of the voting process, all existing EU member states must ratify the accession
terms in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.125
In addition to the unanimous approval of the Council of the European Union and the majority of the European Parliament, the European Commission
has laid out accession criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria, which are
essential conditions that each candidate state must meet in order to become an
EU member state.126 These conditions include the political criteria of maintaining stable institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human
rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.127 The general economic
requirements are a demonstrated ability to maintain a functioning market
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces.128
More specifically, factors considered in evaluating the strength of a potential
member state’s market economy include:
[H]igh quality of economic governance[,] macroeconomic stability (including adequate price stability as well as sustainable
public finances and external accounts)[,] proper functioning of
the goods and services market (including business environment[,] state influence on product markets, and privatisation
and restructuring), proper functioning of the financial market
(including financial stability and access to finance)[, and]
proper functioning of the labour market.129
Additionally, remaining a competitive economy within the EU single market system requires:
[A] sufficient amount of human capital, education, research,
innovation, and future developments in this field[;] a sufficient
amount and quality of physical capital and infrastructure[;]
changes in the sector and enterprise structure in the economy…
[and] a sufficient degree and pace of economic integration with
the Union, and price competitiveness.130
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Butcher, supra note 120.
Accession Criteria, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/glossary/accession-criteria_en (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
127 Id. See also Minimum Standards for Minorities in the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. (INI
2036) 3 (2018).
128 Accession Criteria, supra note 126.
129 Economic Accession Criteria, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/businesseconomy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-economic-relations/enlargement-and-neighbouring-countries/enlargement/economic-accession-criteria_en (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
130 Id.
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Finally, candidate countries must possess the administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis (the rights and obligations
that are binding on European Union members) and the ability to take on the
obligations of EU membership.131 The European Commission also notes that
the European Union’s capacity to absorb new member states, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important additional consideration.132 While Scotland likely meets the political and economic criteria for
membership, in order to achieve the administrative capacity to effectively
meet the obligations of EU membership, the newly independent country
would need to fill the institutional gaps created by its secession from the
United Kingdom, including establishing a central bank and other regulatory
structures.133 The process of joining the European Union is notoriously
lengthy, with Finland being the quickest to achieve accession in just under
three years.134
B. Scotland’s Currency
A hotly debated issue of particular significance is what currency an independent Scotland would adopt. As a group of British policy analysts observed:
That partly reflects currency’s role, like flags, as emblems of
national identity and continuity. More fundamentally though,
different currency regimes have profound implications for a
sovereign State’s control over its monetary and fiscal policy,
access to capital markets, its ability to respond to unforeseen
economic shocks and support financial stability.135
During the 2014 Scottish independence campaign, the Scottish Government proposed that an independent Scotland continue using the British

131 Accession Criteria, supra note 126. See also Acquis, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/glossary/acquis_en (last visited
Sept. 30, 2022) (noting that the aquis of the EU “is constantly evolving and comprises: the
content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; legislation adopted pursuant to
the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted
by the Union; instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; international
agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among
themselves within the sphere of the Union’s activities”).
132 Id.
133 Butcher, supra note 120.
134 Id.
135 Paul Butcher & Dorothy Livingston, Scottish Independence and Currency: Choices,
Issues and Implications, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/scottish-independence-and-currency-choices-issues-and-implications.
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sterling as part of a currency union with the rest of the United Kingdom.136
Although rejected by leaders in the United Kingdom, under this proposal, the
Bank of England would be responsible for the monetary policy of both Scotland and the United Kingdom and accountable to both countries.137 The decisionmakers in Westminster ultimately felt that it would not be fair to expose
UK taxpayers to the aggregating of economic stability risks with an independent Scotland, absent a political union.138 Adding credibility to this concern,
the governor of the Bank of England at the time, Mark Carney, made a speech
a few days before the 2014 independence referendum in which he argued that
a well-functioning currency union would need “tax, revenues and spending
flowing across those borders to help equalise, to an extent, some of the inevitable differences.”139
In 2018, the Scottish National Party initiated the Sustainable Growth
Commission, which proposed that an independent Scotland continue to use
sterling informally “for a possibly extended transition period” before establishing its own currency down the road.140 Outside of a formal sterling currency union which has been rejected by leaders in the United Kingdom, Scotland has four main options for its post-independence currency: joining the
eurozone (thereby adopting the Euro), continuing to use sterling informally
(limited to the medium-term), establishing a new Scottish currency that is allowed to float freely against other currencies, and introducing a new Scottish
currency the value of which is pegged to another existing currency.141 Each of
the latter three options reflects a currency arrangement already in existence
within other small, advanced economies elsewhere in the world.142
In order to join the eurozone, there are formal procedures that prospective
members must follow, “including showing for two years that they can maintain the value of their currency against the euro” and the rule that a state cannot
136

Id.
GEMMA TETLOW & TERESA SOTER, INST. FOR GOV’T (UK), CURRENCY OPTIONS FOR
AN INDEPENDENT SCOTLAND 16 (2021), https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/
default/files/publications/currency-independent-scotland.pdf.
138 Id. at 36.
139 Butcher & Livingston, supra note 135.
140 THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH COMM’N, SCOTLAND – THE NEW CASE FOR OPTIMISM:
A STRATEGY FOR INTER-GENERATIONAL ECONOMIC RENAISSANCE 47 (2018), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/5afc0bbbf79392ced8b73dbf/t/5b0a988c352f53c0a5132a23/15274
21195436/SGC+Full+Report.pdf.
141 TETLOW & SOTER, supra note 137, at 4. But see Ronald MacDonald, Currency Issues
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have a deficit of more than 3% of its gross domestic product (GDP).143 Currently operating at a deficit of more than twice that number and without the
freedom to use monetary policy, the Scottish Government would have to make
more active use of fiscal policy to cushion economic shocks.144 Therefore,
joining the eurozone could most optimistically be a medium-term option for
Scotland; however, if the UK Government continues to shut down the possibility of a formal sterling currency union, this might not ever be possible,
leaving a newly independent Scotland with a choice between continuing to
use sterling informally or launching a new currency (either free-floating or
pegged).145
Based on its current economic prognosis, it seems unlikely that Scotland
would be able to accrue enough foreign exchange reserves at a reasonable
price to support a pegged currency.146 As one economist explains:
The challenges and costs of setting up a new currency have
been debated extensively, including the amount of reserves
needed to back it and how a newly independent Scotland might
work with the remaining parts of the UK. The reserves needed
to back any new currency would be substantial, most
likely tens of billions depending on how Scotland’s financial
system was structured. These reserves are … unlikely to be met
by any inheritance from the UK.147
As a consequence of this reality, the most viable options seem to be establishing a new Scottish currency that is allowed to float freely against other
currencies, or continuing to use sterling in the absence of a formal currency
union until conditions are proper for the introduction of a new Scottish currency.148 Each option would come with challenges, and the main points of
consideration in weighing the trade-offs between currency options involve
trade costs, ability to respond to economic shocks, exchange-rate volatility,
constraints on fiscal policy, and impact on financial services.149
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C. Economic Borders
The Scottish National Party has stated that its policy will be to seek an optout from the Schengen area as part of its EU application because “joining the
Schengen area would be incompatible with agreeing to continue passport free
travel and free movement” between Scotland and the rest of the UK, Ireland,
the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands.150 The border-free Schengen Area
guarantees free movement to more than 400 million European citizens in 26
countries (22 out of 27 EU member states) along with non-nationals living
within the Area or visiting as tourists, exchange students or for business purposes (anyone legally present).151 Free movement enables citizens to travel,
work and live in another European country and move around the Schengen
Area without being subject to border checks.152 However, as an EU legislative
summary notes:
Opening up internal borders is one side of the Schengen coin.
The other is to ensure the safety of its citizens. This involves
tightening and applying uniform criteria on controls on entry
by non-Schengen nationals at the common external border, developing cooperation between border guards, national police
and judicial authorities and use of sophisticated information
exchange systems.153
Before the United Kingdom left the European Union, it and Ireland were
the only EU members who were allowed opt-outs from the Schengen area
when it became part of EU law in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam.154 If
Scotland is not granted an opt-out, a hard border would be created between an
independent Scotland and the United Kingdom, which is its largest trading
partner by far.155 The estimates published by the Scottish Government for
2018 indicate that 60% of Scottish exports go to the rest of the United Kingdom, while the rest is split about evenly between the European Union and the
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rest of the world.156 As for Scotland’s imports, 67% came from the United
Kingdom in 2017.157
An alternative, middle-ground approach to its new relationship with the
European Union, short of membership, would be for Scotland to join the European Economic Area (EEA) which would mitigate issues presented by a
hard border between Scotland and the United Kingdom.158 The Agreement on
the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement), which entered into force on
January 1, 1994, brings together the EU member states along with Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway into a single market, referred to as the “internal
market.”159 The EEA Agreement:
[G]uarantees equal rights and obligations within the internal
market for individuals and economic operators in the EEA. It
[also] provides for the inclusion of EU legislation covering the
four freedoms — the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital — throughout the 30 EEA States. In addition,
the Agreement covers cooperation in other key areas such as
research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture, collectively known as “flanking and horizontal” policies.160
Thus, joining the European Economic Area would allow Scotland to attain
many of the major benefits it previously enjoyed as part of the European Union.
D. Maritime and Land Boundaries
With three decades of violent conflict known as “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland fixed in the national memory of the United Kingdom, the delineation of future land and maritime boundaries between the United Kingdom and
Scotland must be approached with significant care, especially “given the intrinsic relationship between territory and national identity, and also in view of
sovereign rights over natural resources such as existing and potential oil and
gas fields, and offshore wind, wave, tidal and Carbon Capture Usage and
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Storage (CCUS) projects.”161 The original land boundary between Scotland
and England was established in 1237 with the Treaty of York.162 While some
borderlands were disputed during the following two centuries, it remains one
of the oldest continuously existing borders in the world with the exception of
Berwick-upon-Tweed, which was annexed by England in 1482.163 In the event
of a successful referendum in favor of Scottish independence, it would be vital
for an agreement to be reached regarding the maritime boundaries between
Scotland and the United Kingdom. The United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) spells out the procedure for the delimitation of
maritime boundaries between adjacent coastal states.164 First, the two states
must seek to agree on the boundary together.165 If an agreement cannot be
reached, the territorial dispute can be resolved either by a tribunal or by the
International Court of Justice.166 Because international law has been extensively developed in this area, there are clear principles to be applied through
three key steps: determine whether a historic agreement is in place between
the parties in relation to all or part of the boundary in question; determine the
line of equidistance; and assess whether any special circumstances exist which
might necessitate adjusting the line of equidistance to achieve a fair and equitable outcome.167
Traditionally, this included geographical factors such as length and configuration of coastlines, as well as non-geographical factors like historical
rights and socio-economic circumstances, including fishing rights.168 Pending
a formal agreement regarding delimitation, UNCLOS provides that states
must “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the
reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice
to the final delimitation.”169 Practically speaking, the United Kingdom and
Scotland “should be able to reach temporary agreements (such as establishment of a joint development zone) to facilitate (continued) investment in, and
exploitation of, natural resources in territory yet to be finally delimited.”170
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In this case, the conversation between Scotland and the United Kingdom concerning the maritime boundary is likely to center on the difference
between two lines sitting about 5,500 nautical miles apart.171 The first of these
was drawn in 1987 under the Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction (Offshore Activities) Orders, which divided the United Kingdom’s territorial waters and waters within its continental shelf into English, Scottish, and Northern Irish parts
and provided that the respective civil and criminal law of each state would
apply to its waters.172 Following devolution and the 1998 Scotland Act, a different boundary line was adopted in the Scottish Adjacent Waters Boundaries
Order, which had the stated purpose of dealing with environmental protection
and fisheries delimitation.173 However, because this new boundary significantly reduces the area of Scotland’s territorial waters (and the corresponding
number of oil and gas fields), some have seen it as an attempt by the United
Kingdom to establish a clear marker following devolution that is more consistent with the line of equidistance.174 While the issues of international law
that are likely to arise in the event of Scottish independence may be somewhat
unique, established principles exist to guide the process.175
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of vast changes in the political, economic, and social landscape
of the United Kingdom, combined with the functional breakdown of the devolution settlement in the two years following Britain’s exit from the European Union, it is now in the Scottish national interest to hold a second independence referendum and achieve sovereignty and independence from the
United Kingdom. While any democratic secession process is bound to encounter obstacles and uncertainties, the Government of Scotland has published extensive research and policy propositions for handling any difficulties
that may arise, both expected and unexpected, on its journey to becoming,
once again, a free Scotland.
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